Just a month after seizing 70 million euros from a Ukrainian convoy, Viktor Orbán announced the discovery of two backpacks containing explosives of “devastating” power on the Serbian-Hungarian border. The devices were found near the ethnic-majority Hungarian village of Trešnjevac (Oromhegyes), near to where the TurkStream gas pipeline crosses into Hungary.

Mr Orbán wasted no time in responding to the crisis, adorning himself with a hard hat and promptly hopping into a helicopter alongside Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó to inspect the (undamaged) pipeline. “This is our umbilical cord”, stated a stern Orbán in an announcement via Instagram, “without it, the Hungarian economy stops”. He thanked Serbian authorities for their “swift and effective” action before declaring that, with the correct vigilance and military oversight, Hungarian gas supply is no longer in imminent danger. Serbian president Aleksandar Vučić personally informed the Hungarian Prime Minister by phone.

Foreign Fiddling or False Flag?

Péter Magyar, Mr Orbán’s opponent — who research group Médian currently predict could win a two-thirds parliamentary majority — was also swift in his response. In an interview with Telex, the insurgent Magyar hinted that the pipeline crisis may be a fabricated one.

“Just like during the Slovakian elections, Orbán helped out his socialist friend and they brought migrants to the Slovak border to incite fear there too” stated Magyar, “and now he is doing the same with his Serbian friend”. In an affront characteristic of a campaign with a week left before election day, he added that “if the threat was real, a prime minister would not be playing circus with a construction helmet on and fueling fear, but demonstrating stability, safety and governance — this is really lacking right now”.

But whilst Magyar claims a false flag operation aided by Russian support, Fidesz have implied the attempted sabotage may have been orchestrated by Ukraine. Szijjártó likened the incident to the blowing up of the Nordstream pipeline in 2022, when “initially, the Russians were accused (...) and then it turned out they were Ukrainians”.

The Ukrainian Factor

The pipeline in question, the TurkStream, supplies 56% of Hungary’s natural gas according to the foreign minister. Together with the Druzhba oil pipeline, which Ukraine has kept closed since a Russian drone strike allegedly damaged it in late January, the two account for a majority of Hungary’s total energy imports — a lynchpin issue of this election.

As shown in a previous article, the issue of Ukraine more generally has been the primary point of attack from Fidesz during this election cycle. As a model for populists across the world, Orbán has run each of his previous successful campaigns with a primary, imminent outside threat in the crosshairs: the incumbent socialists, migrants, the EU, NGOs and multinationals, George Soros. However, the latest argument portraying Zelenskyy’s Ukraine as the preeminent danger to Hungary has had limited success.

Hungarian public opinion on Ukraine is divided. In a poll conducted by Tisza, only 58% supported the country’s accession to the EU, and the two countries’ geographic proximity has raised understandable concerns about war. Moreover, increased energy costs and Europe’s distancing from Russia have affected Hungary disproportionately. With the country already under economic strain, and not having fully recovered a peak inflation rate of 25% in 2023, the cost of living has become untenable for many Hungarians.

However, unlike in previous campaigns, Fidesz has not successfully connected the dots. Orbán’s warnings that the EU will drag Hungary into war — and more recently that Ukraine will attack Hungary directly — have come off as frantic fearmongering. “People are tired of this narrative”, argues one journalist from Partizán.

Magyar has also danced carefully around the issue. With less than a week until the day of the election, his image seems more favourable in the public eye. The attacks against his campaign, including a honeytrap kompromat operation, intelligence service disruption of Tisza’s IT systems, and the attempts to link Magyar’s campaign to Ukrainian and EU meddling seem to be falling on deaf ears.