30 million euros and 45 million dollars in cash, with 9kg in gold ingots, a sample of which lies proudly displayed on a flimsy wooden table. This was the score authorities seized from an armoured Ukrainian convoy travelling across Hungary on March 5th. With less than a month to go until the elections, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán ordered the assets, belonging to Ukraine’s state-owned Oschadbank, to be impounded for 60 days while tax authorities investigate the case — a subtle hint he still expects to be in power come April 12th.
This came just a day after Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy cast a veiled threat, hoping that “no-one in the European Union [would] block the 90 billion euros in aid” to his country, otherwise he would “give the address of this person to the armed forces”. Of course Zelenskyy was referring to Orbán, who vetoed the large aid package in the weeks prior. In a rare alignment of the EU and Hungary, Commission spokesman Olof Gill condemned Zelenskyy’s comment as “unacceptable”.
The Prime Minister wasted no time in translating these frictions into a national security crisis. In a video released to his social media, a visibly emotional Orbán was seen calling his daughters to warn them of Ukrainian threats against the family. After convening the Defence Council on March 9th, Orbán commented: “Oil price explosion. That’s where the Ukrainian oil blockade and the situation in the Middle East have led to”. He previously deployed troops to key energy infrastructure sites to protect against “further [sabotage] actions” by Ukraine.
But whilst Orbán rings the alarm bells and remains confrontational with Kyiv, his opposition’s stance on the matter remains less clear. The Tisza party still leads Orbán’s Fidesz by between 5 and 14 percentage points (depending on your choice of pollster), but the insurgent Péter Magyar has tread lightly around the issue of Ukraine.
Magyar’s Dilemma
On the one hand, Magyar has promised to be more cooperative with the EU and NATO. He has attempted to reframe Hungary’s sovereignty deficit as not coming from a lack of independence from Brussels, but a lack of access to the funds they froze to Orbán, and a dependence on Russian energy imports. After all, Hungary’s most recent veto was predicated on Ukraine’s failure to reopen the Druzhba pipeline, the primary route of Russian oil to Hungary, after Ukraine claims it was damaged by a Russian strike on January 27th.
On the other hand, Magyar has not broken significantly with the government’s stance on Ukraine. The issue has become a highly sensitive one in Hungary, with Orbán constantly alerting the population to the possibility of being dragged into a costly war with the North-Eastern neighbours. On March 10th, the Hungarian parliament adopted a resolution firmly rejecting Ukraine’s potential EU accession. With the bill passing 142 to 28, it is evident that even in the face of a potential unseating, Fidesz remains a disciplined parliamentary machine.
What do the Hungarians think?
Whether the move is reflective of a nationwide consensus is unclear, but Magyar — erring on the side of caution — has deferred the issue of Ukrainian accession to a future referendum. Only 58% of his Tisza supporters backed the idea in a self-led poll.
Not wishing to alienate any voters, he has also repeatedly repudiated the idea of sending military and financial aid to Ukraine. Tisza’s 240-page manifesto scarcely mentions the country, and when recently confronted with the notion that Ukraine dragging Hungary into war was unrealistic, Magyar replied with an ambiguous “I hope so”.
Fidesz have long-positioned Magyar’s campaign as being bankrolled by the EU and Ukraine — with the recent cash seizure being used as further evidence to this point. Similarly, Tisza have repeatedly accused Fidesz’ maneuvers of being assisted by Russian intelligence. Clearly, the election has drawn the eye of many foreign observers.
Despite Tisza’s seemingly robust lead, their hesitance on Ukraine may signal that Orbán has successfully convinced the populace of the imminent danger of this war to Hungary. Although Magyar may be a shoo-in among the liberal ‘elite’, much of this election is being fought for the rural and elderly vote — a demographic among which Tisza don’t perform as well. In particular, the country’s mood around Ukraine, and their view on which of the two candidates is most likely to keep them out of a hypothetical war, may be the deciding factor in April.