Péter Magyar (or Magyar Péter, using Hungarian nomenclature) is leading the first real challenge to the power Orbán and his Fidesz party have held in Budapest since 2010. His name, “Magyar”, literally means “Hungarian” – and his inexorable rise has aptly inspired a revived and revised patriotism among many in the country.

As the media likes to do with young politicians, the 44-year-old Magyar has been described as ‘dynamic’ – something the 62-year-old Orbán can hardly claim. Since defecting from Fidesz in the wake of a child abuse scandal, Magyar has put that dynamism to use during extensive nationwide tours, drawing crowds of tens of thousands – occasionally even surpassing six digits. Although the government remains dismissive of this momentum publicly, sources close to Fidesz reveal there is an increasing level of concern over the size of crowds Magyar attracts.

But Orbán has been in power with a supermajority since 2010. For all the justifiable criticisms of the government’s corruption and sly political maneuvering, they were genuinely elected on a sweeping mandate and have relied on real public support. How, then, has the arrival of Magyar - a relative newcomer - put Orbán’s seemingly robust political dynasty in serious jeopardy?

The Background

The year is 2024, and Orbán’s government seems to have weathered the storm. Less than twelve months earlier, Hungarian year-on-year inflation surged to 25% and food prices were up 50%. Hungarian dependence on Russian fossil fuels left the country exposed when global energy prices soared, and the currency – the Hungarian Forint – went into freefall. In an attempt to normalise things, the Hungarian National Bank hiked interest rates to an astronomical 18%, worsening the already unaffordable cost of living crisis.

However, by early in the year the situation looked to be stabilising. Fidesz had regained favour with some of the public, offering generous tax rebates to families and 13th-month payments to pensioners. Just as the party thought it had successfully swept the Hungarian peoples’ concerns under the rug, political disaster struck.

In February, news broke that two of the highest-ranking government officials had helped cover up a child sex abuse scandal – an especially bad look for Fidesz, who had long-positioned themselves as the ‘pro-family’ party. It was revealed that Hungary’s first female president, Katalin Novák, had pardoned Endre Kónya, the deputy director of an orphanage, who helped cover up numerous instances of sexual abuse against children at the orphanage carried out by his superior.

With presidential pardons in Hungary not required to be disclosed to the public, the affair almost went unnoticed. However, a pardon does not clear one’s criminal record entirely. When Kónya appealed his case to the Supreme Court – whose rulings are public – mention of the pardon appeared almost as a legal footnote, stating that the remainder of his sentence had been commuted by a presidential pardon. Almost immediately, a journalist from 444.hu – one of the few remaining media outlets not under government control – picked up on the story, and it took the country by storm.

Unsurprisingly, this sent Fidesz into crisis – and a detail crucial to our story emerges. Among the high-profile names on the chopping block was Judit Varga, Minister of Justice. Since the Minister must countersign any presidential pardons, Varga’s name was naturally second only to Novák’s on the list of resignations. Varga also happens to be the ex-wife of a certain Péter Magyar.

Defection from Fidesz

Magyar, then still a member of Fidesz, seized the opportunity. Following the publicisation of the scandal, Magyar left Fidesz, put out a statement condemning the government, and did an interview with an independent news outlet, which reached millions of views overnight - no small feat for a country of less than ten million.

“I do not want to be part of a system where those responsible hide behind women’s skirts” said Magyar in a now-infamous Facebook post, referring to the Fidesz coverup. “...While they mindlessly sacrifice those who oppose them – not for their own material benefit, but in the interests of their homeland and their compatriots”, he continued.

In his subsequent interview with Partizán, Magyar seemed to imply that Novák and Varga (from whom he had recently divorced) were ‘sacrificed’ by Fidesz higher-ups, and the order to grant the pardon had come from significant external pressure. He continued, revealing the complex machinations of the Fidesz inner circle. In a rare instance of defection, much of the country got its first inside look into the crooked party infrastructure that had ruled the country for over a decade.

However, he soon went further than mere implication. Weeks later, Magyar released secret audio recordings of his ex-wife, then-justice minister Judit Varga, directly detailing how government officials in the Prime Minister's cabinet edited corruption investigation files to protect their own. The Völner-Schadl bribery scandal was no longer just a rumor; it was now backed by insider testimony.

What many Hungarians had known to be true about the country’s corrupt system was now confirmed to them from someone on the inside. When compounded with the effects of rapidly worsening standards of living and the hypocrisy of the scandal to rub salt in the wounds, the country was ready for a channel through which to express their political dissatisfaction – and Magyar was perfectly positioned to be that channel.

Magyar’s Agenda

Whilst Fidesz may no longer be as popular as they once were, their agenda still resonates with many voters. Magyar – an ex-Fidesz insider himself – recognises this, and in expressing his agenda has tread very carefully as to not trample on any feet.

Some argue too carefully, with the European Policy Centre finding Tisza’s European voting record is not too different to Fidesz’s, especially on issues “where Magyar is vulnerable to Orbán’s central campaign narrative portraying him as Brussels’ “puppet””.

Nevertheless, Magyar’s messaging on a few key issues has been clear since declaring his candidacy. Tackling entrenched Fidesz corruption and maintaining a less adversarial relationship with the EU and NATO have been clearly declared as priorities.

“Fidesz has no programme and no experts. All they have left is inciting hatred, division, and lies”, wrote Magyar in an X post, announcing the new Tisza manifesto. The 243-page document is entitled ‘Foundations of a functioning and humane Hungary’, opening with a rallying cry harkening back to the revolutionaries who (unsuccessfully) fought for independence from Austria in 1848. Although Magyar may want to consider releasing an abridged version if he wishes for a better fate than theirs, here are some of the main points of the programme, distilled:

Magyar, whose campaign slogan is “don’t be afraid”, does not shy away from denouncing Orbán and the current government at every opportunity. He has, however, danced delicately around questions regarding the concrete direction his party will take, should they be elected. Taking a page from the inoffensive politician’s handbook, he has talked about “going beyond the left-right divide” and how “now isn’t the time for ideology”.

The desire to avoid alienating specific segments of society is an understandable one in an election where every vote counts. But Magyar’s current hope seems to be that enough people will have had enough of Fidesz for them to elect him as an uncertain, but certainly preferable, alternative. Luckily for him, and thanks to Fidesz’s recent mishandling of everything put in front of them, that gamble may prove a winning one.