For the first time since a return to power in 2010, Orbán faces an election without inevitability on his side. After securing their fourth consecutive supermajority in 2022, Fidesz has seemingly answered the question of whether Hungary has become a one-party state – with an emphatic ‘yes’. Wielding a two-thirds parliamentary majority, the party has been able to operate with free rein in appointing officials and legislating, including the ability to rewrite the constitution.
In spite of valid criticism levied at the Hungarian government over corruption and unsavoury political engineering, it would be unreasonable to claim that Fidesz’ agenda lacks democratic roots. Even the fiercest critic of the regime acknowledges that the orange wave engulfing the country was built on the genuine will of the Hungarian people.
However, that consent has begun to sour into vocal discontent. Hungary’s economic stagnation has made people’s living standards increasingly worse, brought to the shocking forefront when year-on-year inflation hit 25% in 2023. Meanwhile, little was done to dissipate the stench of corruption, with government officials and regime-adjacent businessmen continuing to enrich themselves while people saw real cuts to paychecks and social services.
The situation came to a head when two prominent Fidesz officials were forced to resign over the coverup of a high profile child sex abuse scandal - not a good look for the party claiming to be the protectors of family values. One of these officials happened to be Minister of Justice Judit Varga, (now ex-) wife of the insurgent Péter Magyar.
The conveniently named Magyar has upended political expectations. Once a Fidesz loyalist, he has left the party since the scandal and started his own, Tisza. He is now eleven percentage points ahead in opinion polls and rising, while Fidesz’ trajectory seems solidly southbound. The grip of control Orbán has spent the last decade and a half cementing appears to be unraveling. However, at the time of writing it is little over two months until Hungarians go to the polls on April 12th, and to say the election is shrouded in uncertainty would be an understatement.
Potential Obstacles
First, we can hardly expect the incumbents to play fair. Although undoubtedly possessing a strong mandate, Fidesz have spent the past sixteen years reworking Hungary’s media landscape in preparation for exactly this kind of situation. Thanks to the efforts of the Orbán government, Hungary now has Europe’s least pluralistic media, according to the European University Institute’s Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom. While the resultant fawning coverage would normally preclude the need, the situation may now require its combination with an opaque system of electoral oversight to deliver desirable election results.
Through its autocratic legalism, the party has constructed a system whose election day procedures appear democratic, with the voting process seemingly transparent and little reason to doubt the veracity of the vote count. It is, however, the off-cycle methods that Fidesz have relied on to keep them in power: changing electoral laws, redrawing electoral district boundaries, and directing media coverage favourably. With the polls currently favouring the opposition, this election will test the resilience of Hungary’s electoral framework under genuine competitive pressure.
Second, the Tisza party is a broad-based coalition, with little in the way of an agenda other than “less corruption” and “more EU”. Even if Magyar has enough momentum to carry himself across the finish line, once the orange map is painted teal, he may arrive at the steps of parliament asking “now what?”. If holding together the big tent doesn’t prove to be Magyar’s problem, then navigating the Fidesz-designed political-economic-judicial nexus will. Fidesz has entrenched itself deeply at all levels of Hungarian public life, making it exceptionally difficult to change what is in place.
The Two-Thirds Problem
Hungary’s constitution requires a two-thirds parliamentary majority to change. When Fidesz were elected with such a majority in 2010, that’s exactly what they did, rewriting it in ways heavily favouring the winning party - which, aided by their off-cycle methods, they continued to be for the following three elections. Despite winning 49% of the popular vote, Fidesz hold 67% of the seats.
Ironically, if Tisza win the upcoming elections, this electoral engineering could backfire on Fidesz. Depending on how the votes are distributed, this exact winner-biased mechanism could result in Tisza gaining a two-thirds majority themselves - allowing them to rewrite Fidesz’ 2010 constitution, and potentially overturn parts of the entrenched system. Alternatively, it could leave Tisza with only a simple majority - or even worse, just a plurality - a uniquely complex situation meriting an analysis of its own.
Beyond the Carpathian Basin
What happens next is a matter with implications far beyond Hungary’s borders. Whilst seemingly an unsuspecting candidate, Hungary has recently developed a crucial role on the international stage. The Hungarian model is not only a playbook for the would-be strongmen of the world, but the lynchpin between two increasingly muddled blocs - ‘East’ and ‘West’, to use a Cold War anachronism. Having inspired him, Orbán is no stranger to Trump’s illiberalism. With his return to power and the consequent American departure from the ‘rules based international order’, Europe remains the de facto torchbearer of liberal democracy, with just a single, recurring impediment to its agenda - Hungary and its veto.
Since his ascent to power, Orbán has played the spoiler at every occasion possible. The EU, due to its need for unanimity in decisionmaking, is often constrained by Hungary, who have pursued a promiscuous foreign policy. Hungary’s flirtation with Russia may have helped lower energy prices, but it did little in the way of easing the economic pains brought about by their deeper structural problems and 2023’s runaway inflation - and it certainly does not help ingratiate the country with its European patrons. Similarly, deepening pragmatic business ties with China are a point of contention between Orbán and his allies in the Trump administration.
Hungary’s April election raises the question of what the country’s crucial position in the delicate balancing act of geopolitics will be. Whether it marks the beginning of a political transition, a constitutional stalemate, or a more competitive version of the status quo remains to be seen. What is certain, however, is that for the first time, Orbán’s position is under threat - and the implications extend far beyond Budapest.