After winning their first supermajority in 2010, the Fidesz government radically reshaped Hungary’s political and electoral system. The parliament — which since 1990 had 386 members — was slashed to just 199 seats, meaning 100 grants a simple majority, and 133 for a two-thirds consistutional supermajority.
This new electoral system is a “mixed” one, in which all voters receive two ballots;
Vote 1: The Local Candidate
The first vote is for a local candidate, representing a single geographical constituency; this is how 106 of the members are elected. It is a strictly “first-past-the-post” system: the candidate with the most votes wins the district outright, regardless of whether they achieve an absolute majority.
For example in 2022, in the electoral district of Baranya 2, Fidesz candidate Péter Hoppál won 22,898 votes (44%), and United Opposition candidate László Szakács won 21,226 (41%). Despite the narrow margin, Hoppál took the seat, and the opposition received nothing from the district itself.
Vote 2: The Party List
The second vote is for a national party from a predetermined list. In 2026, the contenders are Fidesz, TISZA, Mi Hazánk, DK, and MKKP. The remaining 93 seats are filled proportionally based on these votes, provided a party clears the 5% threshold.
The Twist: ‘Winner Compensation’
In most first-past-the-post systems (like the United Kingdom or United States), any votes for a losing candidate are “wasted”. Hungary’s system, however, rescues these as “fragment votes”. If Tisza comes in second with 10,000 votes to Fidesz’s 10,001, those 10,000 losing votes are transferred to Tisza’s national party list to help them gain seats in the 93-seat proportional pool. On the surface, this appears to be a fair way to ensure every vote counts.
The devil, however, is in the details. Hungary does not just compensate the losers—it also compensates the winners. Any “excess” votes the winner received above what was mathematically necessary to beat the runner-up are also added to their national list total.
This “winner compensation” (győzteskompenzáció) is the mechanical engine behind Fidesz’s string of supermajorities. It has allowed the party to retain two-thirds of the seats even when their share of the popular vote was as low as 44%.
Electoral Backfire?
In the broader framework of Fidesz’ autocratic legalism, this electoral system is exceptionally powerful at producing sweeping mandates. Combined with the constant fine-tuning of electoral district boundaries, it has reliably delivered Fidesz the crucial two-thirds majority required to operate with constitutional free rein.
However, the 2026 cycle suggests this system could finally backfire. Because the mechanism is so efficient at turning local pluralities into national landslides, if Tisza can flip a critical mass of districts —particularly in the urban centers and swing counties — the very turbo-charger Fidesz built for themselves may be the thing that hands Péter Magyar a governing majority.